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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3607 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STANLEY FOOTE, 
also known as 
MURDER 
 
Stanley Foote, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of  New Jersey 
District Court  No. 2-07-cr-00549-001 
District Judge: The Honorable William H. Walls 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 21, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Stanley Foote pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to being a 
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felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced him to, inter alia, 110 months of 
imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed.
1
  We will affirm. 
 Foote contends that the District Court committed legal and factual error in 
applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6).
2
  According to Foote, the District Court improperly placed the burden on 
him of proving that the enhancement did not apply.  In addition, Foote contends that the 
District Court committed clear error as it could not have found that he had reason to 
believe that the firearm would be used or possessed in connection with a drug transaction.  
Foote appropriately recognizes that we “review factual findings relevant to the 
Guidelines for clear error and . . . exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc).   
  “Proper application of the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6) requires 
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence,” that the defendant transferred a firearm 
with a reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another 
felony offense.  United States v. West, __F.3d __,  2011 WL 1602084, at *5 (3d Cir. 
2011).  After consideration of the record, we conclude that the District Court properly 
                                                 
1
   The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
   Section 2K2.1(b)(6) provides for a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant . . . 
transferred any firearm . . . with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be 
used or possessed in connection with another felony offense[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). 
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applied this enhancement.  It did not, contrary to Foote’s assertion, shift the burden to 
Foote to disprove the applicability of the enhancement.  Its questions were simply part of 
its exchange with counsel prior to ruling on Foote’s objection to the enhancement.   
Nor are we persuaded that the District Court committed clear error.  Foote did not 
take issue with the presentence report’s factual averments, which established that he 
either brokered or sold drugs on a number of occasions to a confidential informant in 
quantities indicative of the informant’s intent to distribute, and that he subsequently sold 
a firearm to this same individual.  Foote argued that, because the drug and firearm 
transactions were separate and distinct, the evidence failed to demonstrate that he knew 
or reasonably believed that the firearm would be used in another felony offense.  The 
District Court rejected Foote’s argument.  Citing Foote’s “interactions with the 
confidential source before” the date of the firearm sale, the Court declared that Foote 
“knew that when he sold that weapon to the [confidential informant] that it, more likely 
than not, would be used together or as an assistance to . . . the [informant’s] drug 
trafficking.”  This finding is a permissible view of the evidence.  In the absence of clear 
error, there is no reason to disturb the District Court’s determination that the 
enhancement applied. 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
